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In 1983 Moira Gatens published ‘A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction’ (here-
after, ‘Critique’).1 Subsequently reprinted in a variety of feminist anthologies and 
in her own Imaginary Bodies,2 this article questioned the uncritical adoption of 
‘gender’ as the preferred conceptual category of feminist analysis. Whilst schol-
ars were eagerly abandoning discussions of sexual difference, Gatens sought to 
interrogate this move. At the time, ‘gender’ (following Robert Stoller) was seen 
to have “psychological and cultural rather than biological connotations,” and was 
thought to have deep explanatory power by extension, providing the best avenue 
for understanding women’s oppression.3 And, if women are oppressed because of 
their gender—that is, because of socially shared ideas about women—then a seem-
ing-solution presents itself: let us degender society by changing culture and mind. 
We must learn that there is nothing innate about Woman (or Man); it is a social 
construct. In short, we must learn that there is nothing about the female sex—the 
capacity to birth and feed a child, the presence of female genitalia and secondary 
sex characteristics, and so on—that entails Woman’s subordination to Man, nor 
her limitation to certain social roles (such as mother, wife, etc.), nor even that 
a person so-sexed is a woman. Such perceptions of Woman are fictions created 
amongst and perpetuated by social actors and institutions. To the extent that this 
basic understanding persists in our general collective consciousness, women’s 
liberation still seems to point to this ‘obvious’ solution; we can and should deg-
ender our societies, treating all persons the same no matter their physical form.4
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Gatens’ crucial observation is that such degendering arguments are predicated 
on an unconvincing assumption that mind and body are separate, and ignores the 
historical and contextual fact that people are oppressed because of the cultural 
meanings that attach to their morphologically sexed specificity. But the argu-
ment was controversial. In an interview with Mary Walsh, Gatens recalls initially 
presenting the piece at conferences in 1981 and 1982, explaining that “it wasn’t 
well received at all,” and “there was a lot of confusion about it… it got a very ag-
gressive reaction from people.”5 One of the reasons for this controversy follows 
from the mistaken tendency to attribute essentialist commitments to difference 
feminism, despite Gatens’ explicit articulation of her intention to demonstrate 
that difference feminism need not fall afoul of this objection.6 Yet, one can see 
how it is possible to make such a mistake. Consider, for instance, Gatens’ state-
ment: “I would suggest that some bodily experiences and events, though lacking 
any fixed significance, are likely, in all social structures, to be privileged sites of 
significance.”7 Since this occurs in all social structures, sexed bodies might then 
appear to have a certain inherent nature. But close attention reveals the nuance of 
the claim. As Gatens explains, the body with which she is concerned is “the situ-
ated body,” “the body as lived,” “the body’s morphology”—in other words, “the 
imaginary body.”8 Gatens does explicitly challenge the belief that social meanings 
are made manifest by a neutral consciousness and that masculine and feminine 
behaviours are arbitrarily linked to male and female bodies. But this is not to posit 
an essence which fixes the identities of males as Men and females as Women; 
rather, it is an attempt to take seriously the fact that “we are historically and cul-
turally situated in a society that is divided and organized in terms of sex.”9 This 
observation remains important as ever in contemporary western societies, for, as 
Gatens explains, people still “don’t want to acknowledge that biology is also in-
volved in culture,” nor that culture produces biological knowledge.10 I assert that 
the insights advanced in Gatens’ ‘Critique’ remain both radical and important, 
and that the extension and nuanced articulation of the themes of imagination and 
embodiment throughout Gatens’ oeuvre are crucial for ongoing feminist analysis, 
activism, and cultural (r)evolution.
A CRITIQUE OF THE SEX/GENDER DISTINCTION
The aim of ‘Critique’ is to demonstrate that the two premises underscoring the 
degendering proposal are unconvincing. They are: 
1. the body is neutral and passive with regard to the formation of 
imagination and embodiment in the work of moira gatens · 31 
consciousness… [and]
2. one can definitively alter the important effects of the historical 
and cultural specificity of one’s ‘lived experience’ by conscious-
ly changing the material practices of the culture in question.11
Against the rationalist view (premise one), following Freud, Gatens argues that 
subjects are perceptual beings. The important insight here is that perception is an 
active rather than passive process, and that much of what is perceived by the body 
“never even enters consciousness but remains preconscious or unconscious.”12 
Moreover, if the body were passive, then it could be trained to respond appropri-
ately to certain stimuli and relied upon to consistently react in a certain way. But 
this is not what bodies do; bodies are actively and flexibly engaged in the world. 
Because subjectivity is not passive, it cannot be reduced to the mere body (as the 
behaviourist would have it), and because most of what is perceived through the 
body never makes it to the level of consciousness but does orient the subject in 
the world, subjectivity cannot be reduced only to mind either. This takes care of 
the claim that the body is passive with regard to the formation of consciousness, 
for the body is always in an active and creative engagement with its environment. 
To the point of neutrality, Gatens states bluntly: “let me be explicit, there is no 
neutral body, there are at least two kinds of bodies: the male body and the female 
body.”13 
To the second premise, Gatens charges that it is ahistorical itself; it fails to “con-
sider the resilience of expressions of sexual difference along with the network of 
linguistic and other systems of signification that both constitute and perpetuate 
this difference.”14  Those who desire (or presume we can achieve) a degendered 
society miss the point, stated above: we are historically and culturally situated 
in a society that is divided and organised in terms of sex. What is required is 
an understanding of the body as lived for the subject, given that subjects always 
exist in cultures with a particular historical trajectory, as embodied, and where 
particular features of bodies have particular meanings and will always have some 
sort of meaning. As Gatens later explained, the aim here was “to offer a critique of 
the [sex/gender] distinction using the notion of the imaginary body.”15 It is to this 
concept, and to ‘social imaginaries’, that I now turn.
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IMAGINARY BODIES AND SOCIAL IMAGINARIES: DEVELOPING THE 
CONCEPTS
While Gatens’ notion of bodily imaginaries has developed over time, in this first 
elaboration much of her critique was influenced by insights from psychoanalysis 
and (to a lesser extent) phenomenology.16 Use of the term in psychoanalytic circles 
can be traced back to at least the 1930s—it emerges, for instance, within Lacan’s 
articulation of the mirror phase, which was, in turn, developed from Freud’s ac-
count of the narcissistic ego.17 The narcissistic ego is always mediated by others, 
and to the extent that it can invest its own libidinal tributaries to its own image or 
to parts of its own body, it must come to see itself as not only a subject but also 
an object (-as-seen-by-others). Thus, the narcissistic ego is an alienated ego; “the 
subject that takes itself as its own object is fundamentally split.”18 So, the ego is 
“the psychical representation of the subject’s perceived and libidinized relation 
to its body [as object-ified].”19 The mirror phase is thus designed to explain the 
emergence of the narcissistic ego or unified ‘self ’ which cannot be separated from 
the body.
For Lacan, the preconditions of this genesis are the child’s awareness of a dis-
tinction between itself and the (m)other or mirror-image, an absence of instant 
gratification of need, and the beginnings of a displacement of the child’s depen-
dence—the mirror stage “provides a promise or anticipation of (self)mastery and 
control the subject lacks” at present.20 This external perception of ‘the self ’ is 
adopted wholesale and the body-image comes to organise the subject’s own expe-
rience of its body.21 As Elizabeth Grosz puts it, the ego (one’s conception of ‘the 
self ’) is an imaginary anatomy: “a psychical projection of the body, a kind of map 
of the body’s psycho-social meaning” that is invested with affect.22 It is organised 
not by “the laws of biology,” but by “a culture’s concepts of biology,” and thus of 
“parental or familial significations and fantasies about the body.”23 This explains 
how each subject has its own unique body image, but also how patterns emerge 
across the body images of similarly-(em)bodied individuals (e.g. those who share 
specific sex characteristics). Put another way, the imaginary body is a threshold 
concept, it is neither natural nor cultural, neither mind nor body, neither indi-
vidual nor social, but always inescapably and simultaneously both.24 In ‘Critique’, 
Gatens saw this liminal concept as one from which politically productive theoris-
ing about equality could emerge.
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Feminist understandings of the imaginary body such as Gatens’ also go beyond 
the psychoanalytic conception, acknowledging the relationship of imaginary bod-
ies to social imaginaries. Social imaginaries ultimately produce certain sorts of 
subjects; as Gatens says, “it is misleading to explain the imaginary in terms of the 
creative subjective imagination because without the instituting social imaginary 
there would be no subjects.”25 But subjects also have the power to (collective-
ly) shape the social imaginaries in which they invest and to which they conform. 
In short, the relationship between the two is co-constitutive. For Gatens, social 
imaginaries—i.e. our repositories of collective imaginings, including those which 
underscore what Lacan labelled ‘the symbolic’—are understood more readily as 
a cause rather than the effect of thoughts by individual subjects, even though 
subjects nonetheless remain capable of imagining themselves and their worlds 
anew.26 
The importance of the social imaginary can also be located in the work of Corne-
lius Castoriadis. For him, our social life is a manifestation of the (dominant) social 
imaginary, which is “our most basic ontological category,” and is inclusive of our 
capacity to generate and modify “networks of interconnecting symbols that give 
meaning to our existence.”27 Yet, while Gatens’ own work on the imaginary shares 
similarities to Castoriadis’ work, her focus on the material difference of bodies 
(in the development of individual subjectivity via imaginary bodies) distinguishes 
her insights. Indeed, she has been described as “drawing together the concerns 
of broadly psychological conceptions of the imaginary with those of theorists of 
the social imaginary [e.g. Castoriadis]” and bringing them to bear on the issue of 
embodiment.28 Also influential for Gatens were insights on the body arising out of 
the phenomenological tradition (as mentioned above), particularly in the work of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. So, for her, the imaginary includes elements of both the 
“conscious, imagining, and imaging, mind,” as in the phenomenological tradition, 
and the “unconscious, phantasying mind,” as in psychoanalysis,29 as well as to the 
stock of images that social collectives are deeply, affectively invested in,30 which 
ultimately and inevitably shape our own bodily morphology—our experience of 
embodiment—and our understanding of the world as meaningful. 
Given this understanding of imaginary bodies, we are now well-placed to under-
stand what Gatens’ hoped to achieve by contesting the sex/gender distinction via 
appeal to this concept in her seminal article. Her argument is not that sexed spec-
ificity entails a specific cultural interpretation that would invariably shape sub-
jectivity in a fixed way. Rather, her argument is that certain bodily features and 
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functions will not escape cultural conceptualisation whatever that may turn out to 
be. Moreover, since there is no ahistorical nor neutral body, we would do well to 
explore the impact of the body as lived for subjects who find themselves born into 
patriarchal societies—such as subjects born into western societies—if we want to 
address oppression as it effects real people. For Gatens, the imaginary body is not 
the physiological, anatomical, nor biological body. And it is “not simply a product 
of subjective imagination, fantasy or folklore.”31 It is constituted in part by shared 
images, symbols, metaphors, and representations, which means the imaginary 
body is inherently, inescapably social. But it is also always affective, embodied; there 
is no separation of body and mind. 
To summarise: we employ ready-made images and symbols from the social imagi-
naries into which we are born, including our shared cultural meanings of biol-
ogy, to make sense of and (e)value(ate) the subjects we encounter, including our 
own embodied experiences. We do this based on cultural conceptions of biology 
which, though contingent, are not arbitrary.32 This has an important implication. 
Since we call upon “ready-made images and symbols to make sense of social bod-
ies,” including one’s own body, to determine what constitutes appropriate treat-
ment of, and value for, certain subjects, we come to find that “it is not what is 
done or how it is done but who does it that determines social value.”33 In short, it 
is not so much the activity that generates social value, rather it is the type of per-
son who engages with that activity that is so-valued within the social imaginary.34 
This allows us to make sense of Gatens’ statement: “it is not masculinity per se 
that is valorized in our culture”—as proponents of degendering would seem to 
suggest—“but the masculine male”:35 a claim which still holds true today. And in a 
patriarchal social context, this is what must be challenged.
THE SPINOZISTIC TURN
Following the publication of ‘Critique,’ the Spinozistic influence in Gatens’ ap-
proach to the imaginary and embodiment—in her feminist effort to understand 
human subjectivity and becoming—moves to the foreground. The feminist appeal 
of Spinoza is vast (though his philosophy was not particularly prominent at the 
time Gatens began to engage with it).36 He does away with the mind/body sub-
stance dualism of Descartes, and his is an embodied monism: a mind is the idea 
of a body, and bodies are always already in a social context, bearing traces of their 
own past. In Gatens’ words, “the body is the ground of human action,” and “the 
mind is constituted by the affirmation of the actual existence of the body.”37 There 
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is no clear reason/passion split in his philosophy either, since, according to Gat-
ens’ interpretation, his notion of reason is that of an active emotion. Moreover, 
reason is embodied “precisely because it is the affirmation of a particular bodily 
experience.”38 There is also no clear dichotomy between nature/culture, since hu-
man beings are a part of (rather than separate from) nature.39 Indeed, “the human 
body is radically open to its surroundings,” and is “in constant interchange with 
its environment.”40 Spinoza further sees subjectivity in part as “an awareness of 
the body as it is impinged upon by other bodies.”41 Thus, it is inherently social 
and, crucially, always becoming and always in process. 
Importantly, for Spinoza, the imagination is “a form of bodily awareness,”42 and 
the imagination is never transcended. What makes his account of the imagination 
ripe for mining by feminist philosophers are three observations: the imagination 
is inevitably material, it is inherently social (i.e. tied to collectives), and it is suf-
fused with emotion and affect.43 His insights on the imagination and its impor-
tance for feminism are summed up by Gatens as follows:
Imagination necessarily involves both mind and body—and a body that is 
already inserted into a context in which it has certain values and meanings. 
These may well be false, but, if so, that is completely irrelevant, because it 
is through these meanings and values that a body becomes whatever it is. 
So for me, the notion of the imaginary embodies, specifies, historicizes, and 
contextualizes the experience of individuals and groups.44
Gatens marries this with psychoanalytic and phenomenological ideas about the 
imaginary body in order to produce an account of individual and collective growth 
and change that is both contextualized and particular. 
We can also retroactively trace these insights back into a reading of Gatens’ ‘Cri-
tique’ to see once again why it is politically misguided for feminists to abandon 
the material body in favour of analysis of gender (where gender is understood as 
the social construction of a mind that bears no trace of the material form in which 
it is embodied).45 The point is that the cultural meanings of biology are tied up 
in relations of domination and oppression (because bodies are never outside of a 
context), so feminism must fight for different social relations between embodied 
beings that are specific to time and context. And while feminism cannot ignore the 
polarization of men and women that is a part of our socio-political histories, a 
feminism which is attentive to embodiment is not subsequently shackled to rec-
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ognising bodies as always and only either male or female and subsequently Men 
or Women. We can, drawing inspiration from Spinoza, “begin the exploration of 
other ontologies which would be developed hand in hand with a politico-ethical 
stance that accommodates multiple, not simply dichotomously sexed bodies.”46 We 
avoid essentialism too, because we understand that the body is always a body in 
process, in changing contexts, and so its capacities and meaning are always varied 
and variable. By eliciting insights from Spinoza, as well as psychoanalytic and phe-
nomenological insights into the subject’s imaginary body that were drawn upon in 
‘Critique’, Gatens is able to press the importance of embodiment in the constitu-
tion of the subject in a historical and contextualized way which endures through-
out her research. She avoids reducing discussions of difference to mere biological 
essentialism by advancing an account which stresses the morphology of bodies 
as produced within interconnecting and temporally extending social imaginaries. 
Taking on and adapting such frameworks also allowed Gatens to make good on 
another central feminist commitment as she grew her body of scholarship: rec-
ognition of intersectionality—acknowledging the fact that sexual difference is 
not the only embodied difference, nor is it a difference which can legitimately be 
privileged over others in the struggle for liberation.47 Importantly, the dominant, 
overarching, interconnecting stock of images in contemporary western societies 
attaches greater value to certain sorts of bodies and the activities those bodies 
undertake—namely, white, male, cisgender, heterosexual subjects—and less to 
others. The question is: how do we move beyond oppressive social imaginaries 
(which substantially produce specific morphologies of sexed, raced, desiring bod-
ies and thus affect the body as lived) to a world in which our cultural meanings 
and normative practices are instead enabling for a great variety of subjects? We 
must collectively produce new ‘stocks of images’48 (or alter our old ones) in a 
process that is never closed: always contextual, but open ended and always unfin-
ished.
‘CAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOMMODATE WOMEN’S RIGHTS?’ SOCIAL 
IMAGINARIES AND IMAGINARY BODIES IN PRACTICAL CONTEXT
The insights articulated by Gatens in ‘Critique’ have endured throughout her 
writing and have grounded her analysis of contemporary matters of social justice. 
For instance, she repeats her point that the value of social activities is dependent 
upon who performs them in her 2004 article ‘Can Human Rights Accommodate 
Women’s Rights?’ (hereafter, ‘Women’s Rights’):
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The meaning of normative behaviour will vary depending on whose behav-
iour it is. The links between various imaginaries and gender norms crucial-
ly involve the body and bodies are of at least two kinds: male and female… 
Meaning depends upon how specific norms attach to types of bodies.49
In short, we cannot understand gender-based oppression unless we take the 
body-as-lived into account. Gatens then extends this insight by working through 
the rights-based concerns raised by the practice of arranged child marriage within 
some indigenous Australian communities. 
Gatens explains that “normative behaviour cannot be understood, perhaps not 
even judged, without seeing how it fits within the relevant social context.”50 In 
the case discussed by Gatens, the arranged child marriage was defended by the 
man accused by appeal to traditional or customary law. Here the contexts are 
dual: a dominant Anglo-Australian imaginary developed in the historical context 
of settler colonisation, and an Indigenous imaginary with various practices com-
prising customary law. Thus, child marriage could be seen on the one hand as 
child abuse, and on the other an important way of solidifying kinship ties. Gatens 
maintains that the rights of indigenous women must be understood by paying at-
tention to competing social imaginaries as well as the place of specific imaginary 
bodies within them. Thus, we see that the traditional practice of arranged child 
marriage is complicated by the intersectional experiences of indigenous women: 
when one lives across two social imaginaries which mark out one’s place and role 
as an embodied subject in sometimes complementary and sometimes contradic-
tory ways, how is one to act? How is one to become (recognised as) an agent, as 
a subject? How does one navigate and alter the normative expectations placed 
upon subjects such as herself? This question is critical, given that “women are 
the most visible and significant embodiments of culture,”51 which is complicated 
further by the fact that “women who speak out in support of institutional change 
and women’s rights are often portrayed as rejecting their culture in favour of 
‘Westernization.’”52 Yet, it is crucial to recognise that the privileging of Aborigi-
nal men’s accounts of customary law by the Anglo-(masculine-) Australian legal 
system in fact distorts such law so as to ‘justify’ the harms experienced by women 
and girls.53 
So, we see that the fact of sexual difference emerges as central in discussing 
“whose imagination, whose innovations, [and] whose challenges to convention 
have had the force to shift the way we imagine our political communities.”54 In 
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Gatens’ words, 
At base, the normative problem is the very fact of sexual difference, that 
is, the fact that human life is double: man and woman. Yet, in all cultures, 
it would seem, one half of humanity, man, has had by far the major say in 
how and why this fact should be made socially, ethically and politically 
meaningful.55 
But so, too, is race a central factor that cannot be abstracted away from, and this 
is precisely Gatens’ point: these minority women’s identities “are constructed at 
the intersection of two of the most fundamental social and political divisions: sex 
and race (or ethnicity).”56 As she explains in Imaginary Bodies: 
Social imaginaries ‘link up.’ They link up, however, not to form a coherent 
unchallengable front. On the contrary, different aspects of contemporary 
liberal sociabilities jostle against each other, create paradoxes of all kinds, 
and present opportunities for change and political action.57
In sum, it is precisely by paying attention to our intersections that we may be-
come alert to contradictions and articulate our reasons for demanding change. 
These insights thereby retain a connection to her argument against ahistoricity in 
her ‘Critique’—she maintains that “there is no universal Woman” and that “the 
spur to fight for social change is endemic to the places and times in which actu-
ally existing women fight for historically and culturally specific causes;”58 thus, 
if we want to change the material conditions of our lives, we must first make 
the meanings behind our specific normative practices visible, but we must also 
acknowledge that our history cannot be abstracted away from. Though social 
imaginaries and imaginary bodies are “the always present backdrop to meaning-
ful social action,” presentness does not entail a subject’s conscious awareness, and 
so, to change these imaginings, we must bring them (and our history) to the fore-
ground.59 This is no simple feat, since the ways we imagine ourselves and our 
place within the world—our rationale for what we do and how we do it—“may 
be long forgotten.”60 In short, justice requires a twofold response: we must make 
our imaginaries visible—we must re-member them, and we must also endorse 
that women, as much as men, are entitled to participate in the reshaping of their 
cultures and societies—to reshaping the social imaginaries that make their lives 
meaningful.
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STRIVING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: ENUMERATING SOME TOOLS
For Gatens, imaginaries—both bodily and social—require “working through”:61 
imaginaries work at the threshold of a collective affective preconscious that is 
always embodied, which is why they prove so stubborn to shift. As mentioned 
above, we must collectively produce new stocks of images in an open-ended man-
ner to reshape the possibilities for understanding ourselves and our proper place 
in the world. But how can this occur? It is perhaps here that Gatens’ ongoing 
commitment to historical specificity, embodiment, and the need to illuminate our 
preconscious commitments is most evident. The role of affect and its relationship 
to reason is crucial. In her words,
Disaffection with one’s circumstances may result in a radical social disori-
entation which, though painful, obliges one to take stock of where one 
is, where one would like to be, and the most likely means of successfully 
reaching one’s desired destination… To acknowledge one’s disorientation, 
one’s lack of (proper) place, and that one is not alone in this, is to ac-
knowledge the need to collectively create new maps.62
Despite Gatens’ explicit statement that “I am not proposing a theory of the 
imaginary,”63 and Susan James’ statement that “there is no recipe for success,”64 
there are nonetheless tools which can be found in Gatens’ discussion in ‘Women’s 
Rights.’ I extract six for consideration: power, time, contradiction between imagi-
naries, desire for change, critique, and resonance—though none of these is a nec-
essary nor sufficient condition which can guarantee the desired outcome.65 Rather 
than offering us a methodology, I believe that what we can extract from Gatens’ 
scholarship is a provisional lot of strategic approaches that offer us some hope for 
generating change. In short: our tools to elicit changes in our dominant imagin-
ings may not prove sufficient but they can have some effect, and perhaps this is the 
most we can expect when deriving strategies to interrogate and transform what 
has become individually and collectively ‘second nature.’66 
First to power: though the point is implicit, I believe that when Gatens asks “who 
has the authority to define tradition? Who is invited to participate in the reinven-
tion of tradition across time?”67 this very clearly indicates that bringing relations 
of social power to explicit attention will be a crucial stage in strategizing over 
how one will develop their critique of the social imaginary and create new maps 
(or stocks of images). Next, to time, contradiction, and desire: in Gatens’ words, 
40 · louise richardson self 
“competition between different imaginaries”—as in the competing imaginaries 
of white Australia and indigenous groups—“inevitably generates contradictions 
over time.”68 This is what permitted the young girl in the case Gatens discusses 
in ‘Women’s Rights’ to articulate her desire not to be placed in an arranged child 
marriage. Indeed, Gatens explicitly states that “contradictions within and be-
tween social imaginaries, coupled with human desires, are the motors of social 
change.”69 On the importance of critique, we see Gatens stipulate that “deliber-
ate collective resistance to norms, and the imaginaries that support them, will 
involve pushing [the ambiguities of social meanings] to their limit through the re-
invention or reinterpretation of aspects of those imaginaries.”70 This ties into the 
final factor: resonance. As Gatens’ explains, “if particular normative constraints 
are to be justifiable they will have to be more or less consistent with broader so-
cial meanings and narratives”71—thus the critical move must be constructive rather 
than destructive. It must evolve meaning, not eradicate it. 
‘CONFLICTING IMAGINARIES IN AUSTRALIAN MULTICULTURALISM’: 
RETURNING TO INTERSECTIONALITY AND WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
We are left with a niggling question: how to ensure that the changes one seeks to 
bring about are in fact enabling (i.e. permit agency) for a great variety of subjects, 
including those who historically and contemporarily face oppression, and partic-
ularly for those who find themselves located at the intersections of oppressions? 
This question caused Gatens to return to the example of arranged child marriage 
in her 2008 article, ‘Conflicting Imaginaries in Australian Multiculturalism’ (here-
after ‘Conflicting Imaginaries’).72 The concern remains that rights for minority 
cultures “may support discriminatory treatment of individual girls and women 
within the relevant groups.”73 But, as Gatens rightly asks, “where is the Archime-
dean point from which one confidently could rank cultures from the most to the 
least patriarchal,” or the most to the least oppressive, and from where one might 
suggest directives for how less-egalitarian groups might achieve equality?74 One 
cannot assume that western liberal feminism provides such a platform of judge-
ment, for it would imply “that [this] feminism’s norms are culturally ‘neutral’,” 
which, of course, is not the case.75 As Gatens already emphasised in ‘Critique’, we 
are all historically and culturally located subjects76—and “the line between the 
embodiment of one’s [multiple, overlapping] cultural norms and one’s capacity 
for agency is difficult, if not impossible to draw” when this is taken into account.77 
For this reason, Gatens acknowledges Robert Post in his criticism of Susan Moller 
Okin: “distinguishing between enabling and oppressive cultural norms is a fun-
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damental challenge of liberal multiculturalism, a challenge that has yet to be suc-
cessfully confronted.”78 Gatens’ own endeavour to take up Post’s challenge starts 
from the observation that “agency must take different cultural—and historical—
forms.”79
In the context of multicultural, (post-)colonial Australia at the turn of the 21st 
Century, debate as to whether a behavioural norm or social practice is constrain-
ing or enabling for a given actor “will depend on the nature of the cluster to which 
the norm is attached and how that cluster figures in broader imaginaries.”80 With 
regard to the specific practice of child marriage, it is crucial that women in indig-
enous communities are also consulted about what constitutes customary law.81 As 
Gatens makes plain, the struggles of indigenous women are specific to a context 
where colonization and its aftermath have (perhaps irreparably) damaged the 
imaginaries of indigenous communities, such that “for some indigenous women 
the concern is not that their culture…will become extinct. It is rather that tradi-
tions and laws are being passed on to the next generation in a distorted form 
that is deeply damaging to the interests of women and girls.”82 Thus, attempts to 
preserve or return to or to change one’s culture should not be seen as a product 
of false consciousness on the one hand, or cultural abandonment on the other, 
but as a valid expression of agency.83 It is the practice of engaging the historically 
oppressed in consultation and negotiation which is central: whether a practice or 
overarching imaginary is enabling or constraining for certain subjects cannot be 
determined in advance, abstracted from history and context.
FINAL REFLECTIONS
Today, as we continue the social project of women’s liberation, one cannot deny 
that ‘gender’ rather than ‘sex’ is the term with the most social purchase. One also 
cannot deny that nowadays people use the term differently than they did 1983; 
‘gender’ is frequently used as a synonym for ‘women.’84 Gatens argues that this is 
“connected to the original problem” analysed in ‘Critique.’85 Culturally, we have 
not yet overcome the unconvincing mind/body distinction against which Gatens’ 
‘Critique’ argues vehemently, yet which still implicitly associates the body and 
difference with women alone. Indeed, the fact that ‘gender’ has become synony-
mous with ‘women’ only signifies further that it remains Man who is posited as 
the ‘normal’ human subject, as though he has no sex (nor race, nor orientation, 
etc.) of his own. Subsequently, we are not well-enough equipped to attend to the 
deep conceptual roots which perpetuate women’s (and other forms of) oppres-
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sion in a lasting way. This is why the observations made in Gatens’ ‘Critique’ re-
main crucial for feminist theory and activism, and why the central insights Gatens 
argued for in ‘Critique’ continue to reappear throughout her oeuvre, sometimes 
in flashes, and sometimes explicitly. The following statement from ‘Conflicting 
Imaginaries’—published a full 25 years after ‘Critique’—demonstrates that this 
is so: 
Inattention to contextual meaning assumes the existence of an ahistorical, 
acultural, ‘essential’ individual, whose desires and ‘nature’ may be distort-
ed, or illegitimately constrained, by her insertion into a specific place and 
time. This posits ‘woman’ as a ‘universal’ whose freedom may be secured 
by replacing distorting and oppressive local cultural norms with univer-
sally appropriate human rights. But there is no universal ‘woman’ and no 
‘acultural’ individual. This means that the spur for normative change is 
endemic to the places and times in which actually existing women fight for 
historically and culturally specific causes.86
The fact remains: bodies are not neutral, they are not ahistorical, nor acultural, 
and they are not passive in relation to their environment. It is through adopt-
ing the notions of the imaginary body and social imaginaries that we are able to 
see that this is so. While Gatens’ scholarship shifts its primary focus from bodily 
imaginaries to social imaginaries over time, the two never come apart. Embodi-
ment remains a crucial fulcrum around which her investigations into liberation, 
social justice, and human rights spin. Gatens’ scholarship not only offers insights 
into the ways injustice perpetuates (and develops) in contextually specific forms 
over time, she also offers us (some of) the tools we need in order to attempt so-
cial (r)evolution. 
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